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Abstract 
 
We use experimental data collected in Russia and in the United States using a simple 
ultimatum game to evaluate two alternative hypotheses that may account for previously 
observed behavior in multinational experiments. One hypothesis postulates that 
behavioral differences observed in bargaining experiments arise from country-specific 
cultural environments. We submit the alternative hypothesis that different behavior in 
such experiments stems from differences in the demographic characteristics of the subject 
pools within each country. Because of its simplicity, our experimental design allows us to 
discriminate between these two hypotheses. Our findings support the alternative 
hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent years have witnessed a growth in the number of multinational laboratory 
experiments designed to assess the impact of culture on individuals’ behavior, and there 
is little reason to believe that the trend will not continue. This growth is a beneficial one 
in our view, since such studies can provide valuable insights into the factors shaping 
policy successes and failures across countries. Furthermore, evidence gathered from 
cross-country laboratory experiments can be fed back into economic modeling to improve 
our ability to evaluate the role of beliefs and norms in supporting different economic 
institutions in different countries. 
Starting with the work by Roth et al. (1991), a number of multinational 
experiments have been conducted on a wide range of contexts, including ultimatum 
games, public games, and trust games.1 The evidence from these cross-country 
experiments is quite mixed concerning the statistical significance of nationality on 
behavior. There are, however, some problems with the way in which these data are 
interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that observed differences or similarities in 
behavior are culturally driven. These problems concern the control for the effects of 
extraneous variables that may account for the observed behavioral differences between 
countries. In this context, we follow the operational definition of “culture” proposed by 
Roth et al. (1991). According to the definition set forth by the authors, observed 
behavioral differences between subject pools may be interpreted as being culturally 
determined if such differences cannot be attributed to variables other than the nation in 
which the data were collected. 
                                                           
1
 See, for example, Yamagishi (1998a, 1998b), Saijo and Nakamura (1995), Buchan et al. (1998), Burlando 
and Hey (1997), Cason et al. (1997), Hayashi et al. (1997), and Brandts et al. (1997). 
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This very definition suggests that the art of finding culturally determined behavior 
by means of experiments is by no means easy. In fact, there are a number of 
methodological issues that experimental economists need to confront in testing for the 
effects of culture on people’s behavior. Some of these issues include the implementation 
of cross-cultural experimental controls to ensure equivalence in experimental conditions 
across countries. In multinational experiments, uncontrolled language and currency 
effects, as well as uncontrolled experimenter and procedural effects may account for 
observed behavioral differences between countries. Roth et al. (1991) suggest several 
ingenious procedures that, if successfully implemented, ensure that careful comparative 
observations are obtained in this regard. 
A further methodological issue, the sort of issue we mean to call attention to in 
this research note, is that arising out of differences in the demographic structure of 
subjects within countries. The hypothesis that demographic variables influence economic 
and strategic behavior is not new among economists, and there have been a few studies 
examining the effect of gender in economic experiments.2 This suggests that behavioral 
differences or similarities observed in multinational experiments might arise from 
country-specific cultural environments, but also from differences in the socio-economic 
characteristics of the subject pools within each country. Although researchers conducting 
multinational experiments do not at all deny this possibility,3 we are not aware of any 
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 See, for example, Eckel and Grossman (1996) examining gender differences in a punishment game; 
Bolton and Katok (1995), Andreoni and Vesterlund (1998), and Eckel and Grossman (1998a) investigating 
gender differences in the dictator game; Eckel and Grossman (1998b), and Solnick (1998) in the ultimatum 
game, and Croson and Buchan (1999) using a trust game. 
 
3
 See, for example, the discussion in Roth et al. (1991) concerning the different percentage of military 
subjects across the countries. 
 
 3 
such previous study that explicitly controls for the demographic composition of the 
subject pools when testing for the impact of nationality on individuals’ behavior. 
In this paper we look for the influence of selected demographic factors on 
bargaining behavior using a simple ultimatum game. We use data previously collected in 
the United States and in Russia to test not only for the effects of nationality on behavior, 
but also for the effects of other demographic factors that may be related to culturally 
determined behavior. We find no significant effect of nationality on behavior. However, 
we find significant gender-related differences in behavior. To a degree, the results 
presented here add weight to the argument that experimental economists need to worry 
about the demographic composition of the subjects in their economic experiments. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews previous experimental 
findings concerning the impact of nationality and gender in ultimatum games. Section 3 
presents a short summary of the experimental design and procedures. Experimental 
results are provided in Section 4. A brief discussion and concluding remarks are 
contained in Section 5. 
 
2. Previous Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Nationality and Gender in the 
Ultimatum Game 
 
The ultimatum game is a simple bargaining game between two players, which has 
been studied extensively in the experimental literature.4 In this game, one of the players 
proposes a split of a given monetary pie, and the other player may either accept or reject 
the proposed split. If the second player accepts the proposal, the payoffs to each are 
                                                           
4
 For early studies of the ultimatum game see, for example, Guth et al. (1982), Guth and Tietz (1990), 
Eckel and Grossman (1992), Forsythe et al. (1994), Hoffman et al. (1994), Bolton and Zwick (1995). Roth 
(1995) provides an excellent review of this and other bargaining games. 
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dictated by the proposed split. If the second player rejects the proposal, they each get 
nothing. The perfect equilibrium prediction is for the first player to propose a split that 
gives him almost 100% of the pie, and for the second player to accept the proposal. 
The experimental data consistently shows that the first player offers substantial 
positive amounts, and that the second player often rejects small, but positive, offers. 
These observations have led many researchers to propose the existence of some 
uncontrolled for element in utility, such as preferences dictated by concepts of “fairness”. 
One motivation behind multinational tests of the ultimatum game is the possibility that 
such preferences are culturally determined, and that behavior therefore may vary across 
nations. 
Roth et al. (1991) ran a series of ultimatum games in Japan, Israel, Yugoslavia, 
and the United States. Consistent with the proposition of culturally determined fairness 
preferences, the authors found significant behavioral differences between subject pools 
across countries. In particular, they found that while groups in the United States and 
Yugoslavia displayed the usual 50-50 split, the groups from Japan and Israel were closer 
to a 60-40 split. The authors also found that the propensity to reject lower offers was 
significantly less in the latter two countries. 
In the spirit of Roth et al. (1991), testing for cultural influences in bargaining 
behavior correlated with nationality, there have also been a couple of experimental 
studies testing for cultural influences correlated with gender in the ultimatum game. 
Eckel and Grossman (1998b) found that both men and women accept lower offers from 
women than from men. In contrast to these findings, Solnick (1998) found that subjects, 
irrespective of gender, demand more from women than from men. In both studies, higher 
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offers were observed to men than to women. However, none of the studies found 
statistically significant differences in proposers’ behavior across genders. 
As noted at the outset, conflicting results have also been reported in the 
experimental literature concerning, on the one hand, the effect of gender, and, on the 
other hand, the effect of nationality on bargaining behavior within the context of games 
other than the ultimatum game. We submit that the conflicting results reported in the 
literature may be due to the failure of analysts to control for the gender of the subjects in 
multinational experiments, and the failure to control for the income of subjects in 
experiments looking for behavioral differences across genders, given previously observed 
significant wealth effects in decisions where risk is involved.5 
 
 
3. Experimental Design 
A total of 218 subjects participated in this study. In the Russian experiments, 60 
students were recruited from the student population at the Moscow Institute of 
Electronics Technology. Most of these subjects were students in the business department 
at Zelenograd Business College. There were two sessions, one held in November of 1994 
and one in March of 1995. Each session included 30 subjects with fifteen making offers 
and fifteen accepting or rejecting offers. Subjects were paid 7000 Rubles for 
participating, and they bargained over 14000 Rubles in the first session. In the second 
                                                           
5
 See, for example, Schubert et al. (1999), and references therein. 
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session, subjects were paid 8000 Rubles for participating, and bargained over 16000 
Rubles due to devaluation of the Ruble over the period between sessions.6 
The remainder students were recruited from the student population at the 
University of South Carolina, and at the Midlands Technical College in the United States. 
Six sessions were conducted with these students. The number of subjects in each session 
varied between 20 and 60 subjects. Most of these subjects were economics or business 
students. Again, half of the subjects in each session played the role of proposer, and the 
other half played the role of responder. These subjects were paid $5 for participating, and 
bargained over $10. 
All of the experimental sessions were conducted in a regular classroom where 
there was plenty of room for subjects to spread out for privacy. Subjects were given a 
folder which contained all the instructions, and the message forms. The language in the 
instructions used terms like “buyers” and “sellers”, rather than “proposers” and 
“responders”. Proposals were formulated in terms of number of “tokens”, each of which 
had the same value to both players. The total number of tokens that could be divided up 
between the two players was 1000. All players went through a practice round before 
starting.7 
 
 
 
                                                           
6
 The amounts were chosen based on comparative purchasing power for a student in either Russia or the 
United States. The values were meant to be large enough to purchase two reasonable student lunches at a 
University cafeteria. Therefore, while the Ruble was devalued significantly over this time period, the price 
of a reasonable student lunch at the university had not changed as much. 
 
 
7
 A complete set of instructions can be found at http://theweb.badm.sc.edu/lisa/bargain.htm. 
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4. Experimental Results 
In this section we present the experimental results. We focus not only on possible 
behavioral differences between American and Russian subjects, but also on possible 
differences in behavior between male and female subjects. Because gender differences in 
bargaining behavior might be confounded by gender-specific income differentials outside 
the laboratory, we further control for the income level of the subjects. We begin with the 
analysis of proposer behavior. 
 
4.1. Proposer Behavior 
Before commencing substantive analysis of the proposer data, we describe the 
composition of the subject pools with respect to the demographic variables used in the 
analysis. Table 1 depicts the proportion of each gender/income group in the US and 
Russian samples. 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
The figures in the Table show that men had the highest representation among the 
US subjects, as well as among the Russian subjects. The distribution of subjects by 
gender was, however, rather similar across the two countries. In contrast, the distribution 
of the subjects by income was quite different across the countries. Roughly 53% of the 
Russian subjects reported household income over $50000 per year, whereas only 30% of 
the US subjects reported this income level. 
Primary conclusions concerning proposer behavior in the two countries can be 
drawn from the results reported in Table 2. Ignoring the demographic characteristics of 
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the subjects, the median offer in the United States and in Russia is 40% of the pie, and the 
between-country difference in average offers is rather small. Aggregated over income 
levels, female subjects in the United States display median and average offers similar to 
their Russian counterparts. The same pattern of behavior is born out for male subjects. 
Moreover, the similarities in proposer behavior across countries persist after the income 
level of the subjects is controlled for. 
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
In stark contrast to these findings, female subjects in both countries seem to offer 
substantially more than their male counterparts. The average offer made by female 
subjects in the two countries equals about 45% of the pie, and the median offer is 48,8% 
and 42,5% in the United States and Russia, respectively. Corresponding figures for male 
subjects are 31,5% in the United States and 35,3% in Russia, while the median offer is 
30% in both countries. 
The differences in behavior across genders are further illustrated in Tables 3 and 
4. The tables present the distribution of bargaining offers by deciles for each 
gender/income group in the United States and in Russia, respectively. 
 
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
 
As can be gleaned from Table 3, there is a unique modal offer range at 41%-50% 
for female subjects from the United States, and a modal offer range at 11%-20% for their 
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male counterparts. In Russia, we observe two modal offer ranges at 31%-40% and 41%-
50% for female subjects, and a unique modal offer range at 11%-20% for male subjects. 
 
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
 
In summary, proposer behavior seems to be fairly similar across the two 
countries. In contrast, there appears to be substantial differences in behavior across 
genders. These impressions are supported by the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test.8 Table 5 shows the results of this test for the null hypothesis that observed 
offers in the United States and Russia have the same distribution. The test adopted is two-
tailed with no prediction as to whether one sample is stochastically larger or smaller than 
the other. After correcting for tied observations, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 
statistic for all gender/income groups is |z|=.410 (p=.6821). Thus, the data do not give 
evidence which justify rejecting the null hypothesis at conventional significance levels. 
Applying this test to the offers from each stratum separately yields the same 
conclusion.9 
 
(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE) 
 
                                                           
8
 See Siegel and Castellan (1998) for a description of this test. The Windows 98/95/NT 6.0 version of the 
Intercooled Stata program is employed for all the computations. 
 
9
 Unless stated otherwise, all of the conclusions based on the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are similarly 
supported by the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for two independent samples. 
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Table 6 reports the results of the two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the 
null hypothesis that the distribution of offers is the same across genders. The test was 
applied to the data from each country separately, as well as to the pooled data across 
countries. The results support our earlier impression that men behaved significantly 
different from women in the United States sample. Moreover, statistically significant 
differences between men’s and women’s offers in the United States stand out even 
stratifying the offers by the subjects’ income levels. 
 
(TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE) 
 
In Russia, however, gender effects are found only for the subgroup of subjects 
who reported the highest income level. Thus, although the hypothesis of no gender effects 
could be rejected at the conventional 0.1 significance level for the entire Russian sample 
(i.e. without any sample weights), it is only this subgroup of subjects that contributes to 
this finding. This suggests that interaction is present. One may therefore conjecture that 
had the Russian sample been comprised, purely by chance, by a disproportionate number 
of low-income subjects and no account of this had been taken in the statistical analysis, 
no gender effects would have been found, even if the sample were split evenly across 
genders. 
As seen above, the same remarks apply generally to the broader proposition of 
this paper, that failure to account for different compositions of subject pools, namely with 
respect to gender, may produce biased inferences in multinational experiments. Had, to 
take a contrived example, the United States subject pool been comprised predominantly 
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by high-income women, and the Russian sample essentially by low-income men, 
unconditional statistical analysis would show significant behavioral differences between 
the two nations, and yet the causes of such differences could not be interpreted as being 
“cultural” in the sense of Roth et al. (1991). 
 
4.1. Responder Behavior 
The gender/income composition of the responder subject pool is detailed in Table 
7. The figures show that women had the highest representation among the Russian 
subjects who played the role of responders, whereas the responder subject pool in the 
United States was split evenly across genders. 
 
(TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Tables 8 and 9 provide a detailed perspective on responder’s behavior in the 
United States and Russia, respectively. The tables contain the distribution of rejection 
rates (i.e. the fraction of offers that are rejected) with and without conditioning on the 
offer, and on the demographic characteristics of the responder. 
 
(TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE) 
 
The results in Table 8 show that, irrespective of the offer range, female subjects in 
the United States exhibit substantially higher rejection rates than male subjects. The 
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results also indicate that high-income subjects tend to reject offers more often than low-
income subjects. 
(TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE) 
 
An inspection of the results presented in Table 9 reveals that female subjects in 
Russia also reject offers more often than their male counterparts. Similarly, Russian 
subjects in the higher income group display higher rejection rates than subjects in the 
lower income group. 
Finally, the results reported in Tables 8 and 9 are in line with the results from 
other ultimatum game experiments in that rejection rates tend to decrease with the offer. 
A cross-country comparison of the rejection rates indicates that Russian subjects tend to 
exhibit lower rejection rates than subjects in the United States, irrespective of offer 
ranges and characteristics of the responder. 
In sum, there appear to be substantial differences in responder’s behavior across 
countries, as well as across gender/income groups within each country. The non-
parametric Fisher’s Exact test was conducted to determine the statistical significance of 
these apparent differences in responders’ behavior. Due to the structural zeros observed 
for some offer ranges, Fisher’s Exact test could not be conducted, or yielded inaccurate 
results, when offers were grouped in deciles. Offer ranges were, therefore, grouped in the 
0%-30% and 31%-60% intervals for the purpose of conducting Fisher’s Exact test 
conditional on the offer. 
Table 10 reports the hypergeometric probability of differences in responder 
behavior across countries occurring by chance alone. As can be gleaned from the table, 
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conditional on the offer range and on the gender/income characteristics of the responders, 
the data do not give evidence which justify rejecting, at conventional levels of 
significance, the hypothesis that the observed differences represent nothing other than the 
vagaries of chance. 
(TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE) 
 
The hypergeometric probabilities of differences in responder behavior across 
genders are reported in Table 11. The results indicate the presence of gender effects 
conditional on lower offers. The statistical significance of any differences in responder 
behavior across genders, however, disappears for higher offer ranges. 
 
(TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE) 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This research joins the recent body of experimental work examining the effect of 
culture on economic and strategic behavior. We report the experimental results of a cross-
country comparison between the United States and Russia in a simple ultimatum game. 
The findings generally concur with the results from other ultimatum game experiments in 
that subjects do not play the theoretically predicted equilibrium. The purpose of this 
study, however, is not to test whether either of the sample groups’ behavior differs from 
the theoretically predicted outcome, but whether they are different from each other, while 
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raising, at the same time, a number of methodological issues that experimental 
economists need to confront when testing for the effects of culture on economic behavior. 
The results presented here are in contrast with those of Roth et al. (1991), who 
tested for cultural influences correlated with nationality in the ultimatum game setting. In 
spite of the apparently different cultures of Russia and the United States, we could not 
detect any significant behavioral differences between subjects in the two countries. 
Similarly, the results do not fully concur with those of Solnick (1998) and Eckel and 
Grossman (1998b), who tested for cultural differences correlated with gender using the 
ultimatum game. In view of the gender-related differences in behavior found in this 
study, we cannot rule out the possibility that observed differences in behavior across 
countries may stem from the different characteristics of the samples rather than any direct 
correlation with their nationalities. 
To a degree, the results presented here add some weight to the argument that the 
conflicting results reported in the experimental literature concerning the impact of gender 
and nationality on individuals’ behavior may be a consequence of ignoring the 
composition of the subject pools with respect to factors suspected to influence economic 
and strategic behavior. And, to top the argument, there is the possibility that different 
factors may interact, and either boost or inhibit each other’s effects. 
The latter consideration also raises a further methodological concern, one that 
relates to the use of regression analyses when assessing the impact of nationality or 
gender on economic behavior. The lack of a coherent theory concerning these effects 
makes it difficult for the proper interactions to be specified in a regression context, or 
more generally, for the correct functional form to be chosen. This suggests that gender or 
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nationality differentials (or similarities) observed in studies using these statistical 
procedures may be an artifact of having incorrect specifications. As a result, cohort 
analyses, in which hypotheses are tested based on comparable cases with respect to the 
subjects’ characteristics thought to influence economic behavior, might be a better 
alternative. For researchers wishing to use regression techniques, it would be good 
procedure to report a number of alternative model specifications along with a number of 
tests illustrating how robust their results are. 
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Table 1—Composition of Proposer’s Subject Pool by Demographic Variables and  
     Country 
                 Female Male 
 
Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 Total Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 Total 
 
United States 
 
 
0.28 
 
0.07 
 
0.35 
 
0.42 
 
0.23 
 
0.65 
Russia 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.27 0.33 0.60 
 
 
 
 
Table 2—Summary of Proposer Behavior by Demographic Variables and Country 
  United States  Russia 
  Mean Median (SD)  Mean Median (SD) 
 
Female 
 
45.3 
 
48.8 
 
(16.8)  
 
45.2 
 
42.5 
 
(17.7) 
 Inc.<=$50000 43.1 46.3 (16.4)  40.0 42.5 (15.2) 
 Inc.>$50000 53.5 50.0 (16.9)  50.4 42.5 (19.9) 
 
Male 
 
31.5 
 
30.0 
 
15.9)  
 
35.3 
 
30.0 
 
(22.7) 
 Inc.<=$50000 32.7 34.5 (17.2)  39.3 35.0 (24.7) 
 Inc.>$50000 29.4 28.8 (13.5)  32.1 30.0 (21.8) 
All  36.4 40.0 (17.4)  39.2 40.0 (21.1) 
Notes: Data normalized in terms of the percentage offer to receiver. Standard deviations of the means are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3—Distribution of Bargaining Offers by Deciles in the United States 
Female Male Offer Range  
(%) Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All 
All 
[0-10] 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
[11-20] 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.19 
[21-30] 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.33 0.22 0.16 
[31-40] 0.18 0.00 0.14 0.33 0.11 0.25 0.22 
[41-50] 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15 0.22 0.18 0.29 
[51-60] 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
[61-70] 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
[71-80] 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
[81-90] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[91-100] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 4—Distribution of Bargaining Offers by Deciles in Russia 
Female Male Offer Range 
(%) Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All 
All 
[0-10] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.03 
[11-20] 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.38 0.30 0.33 0.23 
[21-30] 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.13 
[31-40] 0.17 0.50 0.33 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.23 
[41-50] 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.10 0.17 0.23 
[51-60] 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
[61-70] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[71-80] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.03 
[81-90] 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.07 
[91-100] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 
 
Table 5—Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test for Differences in Proposer Behavior between  
      the United States and Russia  
Conditional on: 
 Female  Male  
 
All 
 
Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All  Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All   
|z| 0.454 0.728 0.688  0.564 0.241 0.385  0.410 
p-value 0.6495 0.4665 0.4914  0.5729 0.8094 0.7005  0.6821 
 
 
 
Table 6—Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test for Gender Effects on Proposer Behavior by  
     Country 
United States  Russia  ∅  
Conditional on: |z| p-value  |z| p-value  |z| p-value 
Inc.<=$50000 2.955 0.0031  0.520 0.6032  2.803 0.0051 
Inc.>  $50000 2.687 0.0072  2.017 0.0437  3.279 0.0010 
None 3.883 0.0001  1.704 0.0883  4.147 0.0000 
Notes: ∅=pooled data across countries. 
 
 
Table 7—Composition of Responder’s Subject Pool by Demographic Variables and  
     Country 
                 Female Male 
 Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 Total Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 Total 
 
United States 
 
 
0.37 
 
0.14 
 
0.51 
 
0.35 
 
0.14 
 
0.49 
Russia 0.30 0.27 0.57 0.10 0.33 0.43 
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Table 8—Rejection Rates by Offer Range and Responder in the United States 
Female  Male  Offer Range  
(%) Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All  Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All  
All 
Groups 
[0-10] 1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
[11-20] 1.00 0.00 0.83  0.50 0.33 0.44  0.60 
[21-30] 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.50 0.50 0.50  0.77 
[31-40] 0.50 0.33 0.43  0.00 0.25 0.10  0.24 
[41-50] 0.09 0.50 0.15  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.09 
[51-60] 0.00  0.00      0.00 
[61-70] 1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.50 
[71-80] 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
[81-90]          
[91-100]  0.00 0.00      0.00 
 
All Offers 0.52 0.55 0.53  0.21 0.36 0.26  0.39 
Notes: Empty cells are structural zeros, that is, no offers were observed in the corresponding offer range to the 
responder. 
 
 
 
Table 9—Rejection Rates by Offer Range and Responder in Russia 
Female  Male  Offer Range  
(%) Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All  Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All  
All 
Groups 
[0-10] 1.00  1.00      1.00 
[11-20] 0.50 1.00 0.80   0.00 0.00  0.57 
[21-30] 1.00 0.00 0.50  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.25 
[31-40] 0.00  0.00   0.25 0.25  0.14 
[41-50]  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
[51-60] 0.00  0.00      0.00 
[61-70]          
[71-80]  0.00 0.00      0.00 
[81-90] 0.00  0.00      0.00 
[91-100]          
 
All Offers 0.33 0.38 0.35  0.00 0.10 0.08  0.23 
Notes: Empty cells are structural zeros, that is, no offers were observed in the corresponding offer range to the 
responder. 
 
 
Table 10—Fisher’s Exact Test for Differences in Responder Behavior Between the  
       United States and Russia 
Conditional on: 
Female  Male  Offer Range  
(%) Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All  Inc.<=$50000 Inc.>$50000 All  
All 
[0-30] 0.267 0.722 0.249  0.500 0.238 0.083  0.142 
[31-60] 0.491 0.357 0.207  undefined 0.682 0.532  0.357 
All Offers 0.282 0.395 0.184  0.512 0.185 0.165  0.090 
Notes: Undefined values for Fisher’s Exact test arise from the indeterminate form 0/0 when computing the test statistic. 
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Table 11—Fisher’s Exact Test for Gender Effects on Responder Behavior by Country 
Conditional on:    
Offer Range 
(%) 
Income  
 
United States  
 
Russia  
 
∅ 
 
Inc.<=$50000 
 0.018  -  0.016 
[0-30] Inc.>  $50000  0.348  -  0.077 
 All  0.011  0.030  0.002 
 
Inc.<=$50000 
 0.125  undefined  0.147 
[31-60] Inc.>  $50000  0.500  0.700  0.535 
 All  0.103  0.562  0.197 
 
Inc.<=$50000 
 0.017  0.382  0.014 
All Offers Inc.>  $50000  0.335  0.206  0.110 
 All  0.013  0.089  0.004 
Notes: ∅=pooled data across countries. A dash (-) in some of the cells indicates that the sum of the marginal totals in 
the underlying fourfold contingency table is less than 8, which means that conventional probability levels cannot be 
reached by construction. 
